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Abstract 
 
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), this paper considers 
the role of gender in promotion and subsequent earnings development and how this evolves 
over a career. In its use of three career stages, the study builds on earlier work using the 
NLSY79 that considers gender differences in the early career years alone. The raw data 
suggest reasonably favorable promotion outcomes for females over a career. But the 
advantages seem to be confined to less-educated females. And while there are strong returns 
to education for males through enhanced promotion probability and attendant wage growth in 
later career this is not the case for females. Although this latter finding is not inconsistent 
with fertility choices on the part of educated females, choice is seemingly only part of the 
explanation.  
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I. Introduction 
The role of gender differences in promotion rates is the subject of a growing albeit unsettled 
empirical literature. Furthermore, that literature has expanded of late to consider the 
consequences of promotion. Without seeking to minimize the differences in finding and 
interpretation that have arisen (see below), there is now broad agreement that promotion 
plays a material role in general earnings development. The promotions literature has thus 
come to supplement a much older literature on the earnings function,1 while contributing 
independently to the discussion of labor market structure and job hierarchies. The theoretical 
antecedents here include the notion of promotion as a prize, a means of incentivizing workers 
in a tournament-type framework (e.g. Rosen, 1986, and, more generally, Gibbons, 1998). 
Another model, now paying explicit attention to gender differences, has exploited the idea 
that equal-ability women have better alternatives to market work than their male counterparts. 
As a defense against higher quits, employers might well in these circumstances set higher 
promotion standards for females and be less likely to promote them (see, in particular, Lazear 
and Rosen, 1990).2 A reverse application stresses that although an employer may discriminate 
against a group of workers when initially hiring them (i.e. by holding them to a more exacting 
standard) the employer may nevertheless subsequently favor that group when hiring from 
within (Fryer, 2007). This belief flipping model argues that, conditional on being hired, the 
discriminated-against group, which is relatively more talented that the undiscriminated-
against group, will subsequently fare better (be more likely to be promoted) than the latter. In 
this dynamic model of statistical discrimination, ex ante pessimism is replaced by ex post 
                                                          
1Although promotion can clearly also be viewed as a consequence of human capital 
investment, or as indicative of the importance of job match considerations, which clearly 
complicates the task of discriminating between the various models. 
 
2Yet other models include aspects of the informational content of promotions to competitor 
firms (e.g. Waldman, 1984). 
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optimism once the more exacting hiring standards have been applied. 
At the empirical level, as we have intimated, there are disagreements regarding the 
impact of gender on promotion as well as the impact of promotion on earnings. The mixed 
results in large part reflect a literature that has typically examined a single firm (or small 
group of firms) or single occupation and/or that has a basis in cross-section analysis. That is 
to say, only a limited number of studies have used representative samples of workers across 
occupations and firms, and even fewer have deployed panel data estimation techniques. One 
goal of the present paper is to contribute to the debate by presenting new evidence on gender 
and promotion using a longer panel than the latter. In particular, we shall examine a panel 
that encompasses both mid- and peak-career development and not just early careers 
The panel dataset through which we seek to offer a general analysis of gender as a 
factor in promotion and provide unbiased estimates of its effects is the 1979 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79). This survey has two main strengths. First, it is a 
nationally representative sample offering results that can be generalized. Second, since the 
data in question cover 30 years of a respondent’s work history, they allow us to track 
progress over a reasonably long career profile.3  
Although the NLSY79 has been used before in investigating gender and promotion, 
the present study not only examines longer employment histories but also seeks to chart the 
influence of education and broad sector. Education is likely to be of importance in 
influencing promotability and in mediating the returns to promotion. It may also assist our 
understanding of promotion and wage growth by career stage where high levels of education 
are associated with delays in motherhood (Miller, 2011). For its part, the public sector is of 
interest given the greater importance of the public sector in the mix of female employment. 
                                                          
3Another strength of the survey, albeit one not exploited here (other than to achieve a 
consistent measure of upward mobility within the firm across rounds of the survey) is that it 
provides alternative definitions of what it means to be promoted lacking from other 
representative datasets. 
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Arguably, the public sector might be in the vanguard of programs involving equal or even 
preferential treatment for women, affording them greater flexibility. Job assignment might 
also be more structured than in the private sector, with formalized hierarchies and longer 
promotion ladders. Alternatively, sheltered from competition, the public sector may admit of 
more discrimination in promotion than the private sector and/or may make less use of 
incentive mechanisms. Although the public sector has been largely neglected in the empirical 
literature, there is the hint that promotion chances may be lower for females in the public 
sector and among nonprofits than in the private sector (Cobb-Clark, 2001; Devaro and 
Brookshire, 2007).  
After a brief discussion of the promotions literature, the paper addresses two main 
questions: first are there significant gender differences in the probability of promotion; and, 
second, do these translate into earnings differences? The answers are organized around career 
stage. Thus, having established the extent to which differences in promotion can be explained 
by the usual suspects – education, experience, family characteristics, and race – we examine 
the manner in which promotion and the earnings gap between the genders evolve over the 
stages of a career. Within this framework, we next examine how career trajectories are 
influenced by educational status and differ by broad sector. Finally, and related to educational 
differences, we ask whether the revealed gender differences can be explained by choice 
linked to the timing of fertility.  
 
II. Gender, Promotion, and Earnings in the Empirical Literature 
Past research on the determinants and consequences of promotion has tended to focus on 
individual firms or occupations, the rationale being that across-firm differences in promotion 
practices (and wage development) will be either ruled out or that the definition of a 
promotion will be rendered more transparent. The obvious limitation of such approaches is 
that their results may not be generalizable. More representative studies using larger samples 
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of workers and firms should tell us more about which patterns are relevant to the average 
worker, but where based on cross-section data will confront the usual causality issues raised 
by unobserved individual heterogeneity. Panel data such as those used in the present study 
hold out real promise in this regard, while also enabling us to consider the dynamic 
relationship between promotion and compensation.  
Firm studies investigating promotions alone generally obtain negative findings (e.g. 
Stewart and Gudykunst, 1982; Cannings, 1988), although some studies suggest that ceilings 
may be confined to lower reaches of the job ladder (Jones and Makepeace,1996; Spilerman 
and Petersen, 1999; and Fernandez and Abraham, 2011).4 Some firm studies considering 
promotion and wages include positive findings (e.g. Gerhart and Milkovich, 1989, report that 
females have more promotions and that promotions have a similar impact on earnings). But 
more often than not the results are unfavorable to women (e.g. Hersch and Viscusi, 1996, 
argue that greater promotions among women stem from their starting lower on the job 
ladders, while Ransom and, Oaxaca, 2005, point to the near exclusive assignment of some 
entry-level jobs to women and their virtual exclusion from management positions). 
For their part, the extant industry studies are no more upbeat. They report that women 
receive lower initial job placements than males and where employed in similar entry 
positions are differentially promoted after being hired (Cabral, Ferber, and Green, 1981), or 
provide evidence of female job ladders that hit ceilings in certain grades (DiPrete and Soule, 
1988), or suggest that women confront higher promotion thresholds in securing promotion 
(Pekkarinen and Vartiainen, 2006). 
Since disparity of finding may be specific to the firm or industry under consideration 
                                                          
4Occupational studies are even more negative, although most report major improvement in 
gender gaps over time. See, inter al., Spurr, 1990; Spurr and Sueyoshi, 1994; Ginther and 
Hayes, 1999, 2003; McDowell, Singell, and Zilliak, 2001. 
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in these studies, what have we learned from analyses of data based on samples of workers 
intended to be more representative? We refer to studies based on the Quality of Employment 
Panel, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, the 
British Household Panel Survey, and, finally, the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth also used in the present empirical inquiry.  
In a panel study of intra-occupational earnings differences using the Quality of 
Employment Panel, 1973-77, Olson and Becker (1983) confirm the finding that promotion 
contributes very substantially to earnings development. But the authors’ fixed effect 
regression results suggest that while gender wage gains are equal, ceteris paribus, 
promotional opportunities are not. Echoing the industry studies, women are found to be held 
to a higher promotional standard than males. As a result, although the gender earnings gap 
narrowed by some 6 percent over the sample period, it would have narrowed by roughly 9 
percent had men and women been promoted on the basis of the same criteria.  
In a much larger-scale analysis – the previous study’s final sample is just 408 
individuals – McCue (1996) presents data on promotions involving a change in position from 
the 1976-88 survey years of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Promotions are 
compared with separations and transfers as well as with no changes in position. As far as 
wage growth is concerned, the author’s estimates of the effects of promotion on wages 
relative to an absence of any change in position are approximately 10 percent for white males 
and black women and only slightly above (below) this for white women (black men). These 
values pertain to the first decade in the labor market. But promotions favor males. The 
author’s hazard rate results for promotions indicate that black males, black females, and 
married white females have lower hazards than white males. 
Blau and Devaro (2007) consider gender differences in promotion rates and 
remuneration in their analysis of a sample of new(est) hires from the Multi-City Study of 
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Urban Inequality, 1992-95. One advantage of this dataset is that it is comparatively rich in 
firm characteristics. Its disadvantage is the inability to control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. The authors’ main findings are twofold. First, promotion rates are between 2.2 
and 3.1 percentage points higher for men than women – where the mean promotion rate is 
around 9 percent – and is effectively unchanged with the inclusion of detailed controls for 
occupation and industry. The authors’ wage-change-from-promotion regressions and within-
job wage growth regressions (i.e. without promotion), on the other hand, show little 
difference between men and women. 
These three studies all point in a similar direction: lower promotion rates for women 
but comparable gender returns from promotion. A dissenting study is Booth, Francesconi, 
and Frank’s (1999) analysis of the 1991-1995 waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). The authors report that although women are no less likely than men to be promoted 
their earnings from promotion are adversely impacted. They offer a sticky floors model – 
with internal and external discrimination – to explain the failure of women to catch-up, 
remaining stuck at the base of the wage scale for the new grade.  
In the final study considered here, Cobb-Clark (2001) examines the 1988-90 waves of 
the NLSY79. She seeks to decompose the gender gap in promotions (and earnings) into 
differences arising from characteristics and in returns to those characteristics. Cobb-Clark’s 
random effects probit model indicates that women have a 5.8 percentage point lower 
probability of being promoted than corresponding males. Differences in the returns to 
characteristics (demographic, human capital, and job) explain the entire promotion gap. But 
the author’s log wage growth equation points to wage gains for females that are 2.4 to 5.6 
percent higher than for promoted men. At promotion, women experience between 7.0 to 8.1 
percent extra wage growth; for men the relative payoff is less than 4.6 percent. The 
decomposition exercise now reveals a divergence in outcomes between women who get 
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ahead (see also McCue, 1996) and women who get left behind.  
In sum, the more representative U.S. studies of promotion and earnings reach a 
broadly similar conclusion that promotion favors males with a somewhat more nuanced 
position on earnings growth from promotion – with Cobb-Clark in particular finding that 
wage change benefits can benefit (certain) women over men. But the time frame of these 
studies offers only a snapshot of a career. And while we would concur with Cobb-Clark’s 
(2001: 6) assessment that “the theoretical literature is not much help in sorting out the 
observed causal relationships,” our study of career stages while not testing competing 
theoretical models nevertheless seeks to provide a longer-term framework to help illustrate 
the ways in which gender may enter the promotion process. Moreover, as intimated earlier, 
we shall assess the extent to which our findings on promotions and wage growth are informed 
by choice via the fertility decision 
 
III. Data 
Our dataset, the NLSY79, provides a nationally representative panel of data for the cohort of 
individuals aged 14 to 22 years in 1979 who have been interviewed regularly since that year. 
We use the core cohort, excluding the oversample of Hispanic, black and low income youth 
as well as the military. Further, we do not consider self-employed individuals or those who 
work for no pay. Moreover, for our wage growth regressions we focus only upon those 
individuals who are not only currently working full time (which is also a requirement for our 
promotion regression sample) but also who have worked more than 35 hours a week in the 
past calendar year. Here the intention is to exclude wage increases resulting from transitions 
between part-time jobs and full-time jobs (in either direction) in our analysis of promotions 
and wages. Having also excised those with missing information on any of the variables used 
9 
 
in the analysis, or without data on hourly wages (or reporting hourly wages of over $1,000),5 
our sample comprises 18,658 person-year observations (15,684 for the wage growth 
regressions) over 11 waves of the survey – 1988, 1989, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010. The 11 waves in question are those in which promotion questions are 
asked.6 In our analysis, we shall refer to the years 1988, 1989, and 1990 as the “early career” 
phase. This is because the NLSY respondents were then aged between 23 and 33 years. For 
those later rounds of the survey in which promotion questions were asked, we distinguish two 
additional career stages; specifically, a “mid career” phase for the four rounds of the data 
from 1996 to 2002 (when respondents are aged 31-45 years) and a “peak career” phase7 
comprising the four rounds from 2004 to 2010 (respondents are aged 39-53 years).  
The NLSY79 has a number of advantages over other datasets in addition to those 
noted earlier. One is that we can obtain the individual’s actual labor market experience from 
the number of weeks worked since the last interview. This corrects for the potential 
measurement error in the standard experience variable based on age and education, since 
                                                          
5
 We also dropped several observations with data errors, such as were revealed by earnings 
histories indicating wage increases of more than 100% followed by declines of more than 
50% and then by increases of more than 100% in the following round – or a sequence of 
similar rates of decline followed in turn by large increases and subsequent large dips. 
Moreover, we dropped any observations indicating real wage increases (declines) of more 
than 400% (40%).  
 
6Promotion-related questions were asked also in 1984. However, in this survey year no 
measure of firm size was collected. As we wish to include this variable, our baseline analysis 
will exclude 1984. As a practical matter, however, excluding (dummies for) firm size did not 
materially affect the signs or significance levels of the coefficients of interest even though 
firm size is a significantly positive determinant of promotion probability, log wages, and log 
wage growth. Regressions including the 1984 data, excluding the firm size regressors, are 
available from the authors upon request.  
 
7As a robustness check, we also defined career stages by age groups instead of by data 
rounds, excluding anyone outside the age range in the newly-specified rounds of the data. 
Results were mostly unaffected.  
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women may work more discontinuously than men. Another is that it contains detailed 
information on promotions beginning in 1984, then (after a gap) annually between 1988 and 
1990 and, finally, biennially from 1996 onwards. (The survey itself became biennial in 1994.) 
Nevertheless, the promotion question has changed over time, requiring adjustments in our 
data selection and analysis. In the 1988, 1989, and 1990 surveys, the promotion question 
relates to promotion on the current job in circumstances in which the respondent had worked 
with the current employee for at least 9 weeks. However, this tenure condition was no longer 
applied to the promotion questions in surveys conducted after 1996. In the interests of 
consistency, we restricted our sample throughout to workers with at least 9 weeks of tenure 
with their current employer.  
Regardless of the tenure condition, the promotion question always concerns in-house 
promotions, namely with the current employer. In this treatment, therefore, all promotions are 
internal in nature.8 But in our regression analysis we shall also include a dummy variable for 
changing employers since the last interview, because individuals who are new at their jobs 
may be less likely to be promoted to the extent that they may not have accrued enough time 
on the job to demonstrate performance, or to have built up enough tenure to qualify for 
promotions that are automatic in nature. Conversely, they may be more likely to be promoted; 
for example, a woman who changes jobs by reason of her husband’s relocation may accept a 
job for which she is overqualified, and thereby rise quickly in the new job hierarchy.  
There have also occurred changes in the type of promotions that respondents are 
asked to report. Most notably, since 1996 the promotion question asks about promotions that 
are position changes, whereas earlier surveys did not impose this restriction. However, even 
                                                          
8The promotion question is asked for up to 5 jobs held since the date of the last interview. We 
will use the answer for the current job – that is, the job held at the date of interview – as our 
promotion outcome. Addison, Ozturk, Wang (2014) have shown that promotions on the 
current job cover more than 90 percent of all recorded promotions.  
 
11 
 
though position change is a requirement for the promotion questions, not all promotions bring 
about a change in responsibility.9 Another important detail regarding the promotion question 
relates to the change in structure of the survey. As we have noted, the NLSY79 became 
biennial in 1994 so that any question that asks respondents to report events “since the date of 
last interview” now captures events occurring over two years. As respondents are more likely 
experience a promotion with their current employer since the date of last interview if it is 
over a two-year period than a single year, we may be underestimating promotions in early 
career or overestimating them in later years when we do not make adjustments. We checked 
for potential biases stemming from this data collection feature by biennializing our data for 
the early years and re-ran our models for a modified measure of promotions as a robustness 
check. We return to this issue in discussing our regression results. 
Although labor market activity has been surveyed in great detail in the NLSY79 since 
its inception, the occupational codes are not recorded consistently across rounds of the 
survey. Between 1979 and 2000, the occupations are coded according to both the 1970 and 
1980 census codes. Since 2002, however, jobs are exclusively identified using the 2000 
codes10 to capture the new and emerging occupations. We mapped these occupational codes 
                                                          
9Thus, unlike Pergamit and Veum (1999), we did not impose any filters to distinguish “true” 
promotions. 
 
10According to NLSY79 Attachment 3: Industrial and Occupational Classification Codes 
(https://www.nlsinfo.org/sites/nlsinfo.org/files/attachments/121217/att300.pdf), jobs are coded by 3-
digit 2000 Census Codes in the 2002 survey, by 4-digit 2002 Census Codes in 2004 survey, 
and by 4-digit 2003 Census Codes in 2006-2010 surveys. Based on the codes in Attachment 
3, there is an implied “0” in the 4-digit codes, so dividing it by 10 gives us the same 3-digit 
codes as in 2000 Census Codes, except for the unemployed, military, those not in the labor 
market, and occupations that are in practice “uncodable,” none of which is included in our 
sample.  
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so as to be able to study the full extent of the promotion data panel available to us.11 We also 
mapped all industry codes observed over different NLSY79 rounds to 3-digit 2000 Census 
Industry Codes,12 and followed Pergamit and Veum’s (1999) methodology to generate 10 
industry groups.  
In our analysis we used a “balanced” panel of individuals, which required individuals 
to be observed in at least two out of three rounds in the early career stage and not absent in 
more than two rounds in later stages. Appendix Table 1 defines the variables we use in our 
analysis and reports the descriptive statistics for our sample as well as for everyone, including 
those respondents who do not satisfy our inclusion criteria for later years and therefore do not 
enter our balanced panel. Respondents in the balanced panel have slightly higher AFQTs, 
more years of schooling, higher wages, and are more likely to be male and union affiliated 
than those in the general sample who satisfy our sample restrictions but fail to do so 
consistently and therefore do not enter our balanced panel. These differences in samples 
                                                          
11We used the crosswalks provided by David Dorn (2009) and Autor and Dorn (2013), giving 
3-digit occupation codes—or 1990dd—that can serve as a link between occupation codes of 
1970, 1990, and 2000 census. We first use their crosswalk linking 1970 and 1990dd and then 
the crosswalk linking 2000 and 1990dd, so that all occupations in our sample will be 
measured by 1990dd codes in a consistent fashion. We further utilized Autor and Dorn’s 
aggregation to group all occupations to the one-digit level as follows: management/pro-
fessional/technical/financial/sales/public security, administrative support and retail sales, 
low-skill service, precision production and craft, machine operators, assemblers and 
inspectors, and transportation/construction/mechanics/mining/agricultural. 
 
12In the 1979 through 2000 rounds of the survey, industries are classified according to 1970 
codes. Beginning in 2002, the 2000 census codes are used. To match the industry codes, we 
first used the mapping provided in the Census Bureau’s Technical Report #59 (Table 3) to 
link industry 1970 codes to 1980 codes. Between 1980 and 1990, there are slight changes of 
the industry codes and we used the information provided by Unionstats 
(http://unionstats.gsu.edu/IndOcc_80-90.htm accessed on June 5, 2013) to make the requisite 
changes and mapped 1980 codes to 1990 codes. Finally, we merged in the 2000 industry 
codes using the crosswalks between the 1990 and 2000 census. The crosswalk is available 
from http://www.census.gov/people/io/files/indcswk2k.pdf). 
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should be kept in mind when interpreting our results and in comparing mid- and peak career 
promotion and wage growth estimates with those in the literature.13  
Figure 1 identifies our three career stages and charts averages of the annual/biennial 
promotion rates since the date of the last interview, also plotting the 95 percent confidence 
interval around these averages so as to facilitate comparisons between male and female rates. 
Table 1 gives average values of promotion rates over each career stage, adding material on 
corresponding levels of and growth rates in real pay for promoted and non-promoted 
individuals. Looking at each piece of descriptive information in turn, two trends are evident 
in the figure. First, and predictably, as workers age their promotion rates decline. Second, 
females on average enjoy higher promotion rates than do males in the later career years. In 
the early career years, male promotion rates are about 5 percentage points higher than those 
of females in any survey year, each being statistically significant. But in the mid-career 
                                                          
13The table also provides descriptive statistics for those individuals who satisfy our sample 
restrictions in at least one round of the early career years but not in any of the subsequent 
career segments. We call these individuals “early leavers.” Comparing early leavers (in the 
first column of the table) with “early career” individuals in our balanced and unbalanced 
panels (third and second columns, respectively) provides some interesting differences. We 
see that early leavers had higher AFQT scores than their counterparts in either of the other 
two early career groups. They also had more years of schooling, albeit only significantly so 
compared with the general unbalanced sample (“early all”). They were also more female in 
composition, while containing a lower percentage of blacks and individuals with children. 
Leavers also had less tenure on the current job, despite having greater prior labor market 
experience. Leavers were also more likely to be found in low-skill service and administrative 
support type occupations and less likely to come from machine operation and assembly, 
transportation occupations, and manufacturing industry. Further, they were more prone to 
work in small firms and in the private sector than either of the other two early career groups. 
Finally, even if they received a significantly higher average wage, they were promoted less 
and were also less likely to be union affiliated. We also identified a group we term “mid 
career exits,” namely individuals we observe at least once in both early and mid career in our 
sample but not in the peak career years. These individuals were more similar to the general 
population than the early leavers but more female than the balanced panel. They were also 
less Hispanic and less likely to be married compared with the early leavers and the general 
population in early career (the “early all” category). 
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(1996-2002) years, the advantage switches over to females: and for any year in this interval 
and in peak career (2004-2010) their rates are as high as those of males – actually higher 
whenever the differences are significant. As promotions have been found to be important 
components of wage growth, one might expect this reversal in promotion trends to ameliorate 
the gender pay gap over the career of our workers.  
[Figure 1 and Table 1 near here] 
However, the summary values in Table 1 show that in early career even though their 
promotion rates are lower, females have slightly higher wage growth when promoted than do 
males. More importantly, females experience higher relative returns to promotion (12.6% 
versus 7% for males; 12.7% versus 5.8% for females). Moreover, even though female 
promotion rates are improving on average over the course of their careers relative to males 
the same is not true of promotion-related earnings. In fact, reversals are the order of the day: 
while promoted males realize 17 percent wage growth in mid career and 13.4 percent in peak 
career, the corresponding values for females are only 14.9 percent and 11.2 percent. The 
differences are economically significant and even though we cannot reject the null on a two-
sided test, male returns are significantly higher than female returns at the 15 percent level.  
 
IV. The Empirical Model 
We do not structurally model promotion probability and its consequences but instead follow 
the same theoretical route as Cobb-Clark (2001) in constructing our empirical models. In this 
framework, the probability that worker  of gender g is promoted in job j at time t, 
	 = 1,		is determined as a function of a latent index Y –  let us call it an index of 
promotability after Cobb-Clark –  as follows:                                                                                                                  
	
∗ = 	 + 	 + 	,                    (1) 
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	 = 1 = (	
∗ > 0), 
where 	 is a vector of the worker’s demographic, human capital and job related 
characteristics, such as education, (the unexplained portion of the) Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery [ASVAB] test score (which we use as a measure of unobserved 
ability), marital status, number of children, tenure with the current employer, labor market 
experience prior to the current employer, the local unemployment rate, collective bargaining 
coverage/union status, and the occupation, sector and industry of the job. Finally, 	 is the 
unobserved factors that determine the promotion probability at time t for worker i.  
We first estimated the promotion model treating the data as pooled cross-section using 
logistic regression and then allow 	 to have a fixed individual component that is correlated 
with observed characteristics. We fit this panel data specification using conditional logistic 
regression with fixed effects. All the estimations were undertaken using STATA 13. We note 
parenthetically previous studies (viz. Booth, Francesconi, and Frank, 1998; Cobb-Clark, 
2001) used a random-effect (RE) model to estimate the gender gap in promotion. 
We are interested in the consequences of promotions as materialized in wage growth. 
To assess the relative wage gains from promotion we estimate a log-wage growth equation, 
defined as follows: 
∆	 = 	 − 	 ! = "	#	 − "	 !#	 ! + $	+%& − %&−1,           (2) 
where #	 comprises a vector of human capital and job characteristics as well as indicators of 
labor market conditions and  	  is the promotion indicator, which is by definition a change 
from the last period’s status. There are likely to be a number of unobserved determinants of 
wage growth that are correlated with observed covariates such as education and occupation, 
that is %	 = '& + ( and Corr((, #	) ≠ 0. The wage growth equation factors out the fixed 
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individual unobserved effects, allowing us to estimate equation (2) using OLS.14 We are 
assuming returns to characteristics such as tenure, experience, schooling and sector are time 
variant and returns to promotion vary by gender, education, and career stage as well as sector.  
 
V. Findings  
(a)  Promotion disparity by gender  
Table 2 reports the estimates from promotion probability models.15 The first three models 
treat the data as cross section and ignore the possibility of time-constant individual specific 
unobserved factors in equation (1).  For the specification in Model 4, we utilize the panel 
nature of our data and allow the unobserved factors to be correlated with the observed 
covariates. We use logistic regression for the first three models and conditional fixed effects 
logistic regression for the last model using Stata 13.  
To make the gender differences visually distinct we report the coefficient estimates 
for each model in two columns. The first column will give the coefficient estimates for the 
main variable and the second column (bolded) will report the estimate for that variable when 
interacted with the female dummy. (The coefficient estimate for the female dummy indicator 
itself is provided in the first row of the table.)  Thus, looking at the two sets of figures side by 
                                                          
14Observe that since the current employer may be a new employer, the previous wage is not 
necessarily the wage received immediately before the promotion event but conceivably that 
with a different employer the worker had at the date of last interview.  
 
15These estimates ignore the change in survey data collection frequency. Estimates with 
biennialized early career data are very similar and are available from the authors upon 
request. We also ran separate regressions for each career stage. However, in estimating 
Model 4, this setup results in the loss of many observations – since one is less likely to 
observe promotions over the course of three to four rounds as compared with ten 10 rounds of 
data – and conditional logit estimation cannot use observations with no change in the 
outcome variable. Nevertheless, the resulting estimates are mostly unchanged in sign and 
magnitude although they are estimated with much less precision. 
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side, we can assess how the factor contributes to promotability and also how this contribution 
varies by gender. In all these models, males in the private sector with at most a high school 
diploma are the base (excluded) group.  
[Table 2 near here] 
Our first task is to determine whether the promotion trends in the raw data (from 
Figure 1 and Table 1) disappear when we control for the usual human capital controls – such 
as education, tenure, experience, and unobserved ability – together with firm size, 
unionization, sector, occupation, and industry of employment. Under Model 1, we only allow 
the constants to differ by gender and career stage, to capture the change in average incidence 
of promotions and also changes in gender differences as workers age. We see that controlling 
for human capital variables does not erase the decline in promotion incidence (the coefficient 
estimate for mid-career is -0.230 and for peak career it is -0.548, implying for males in the 
private sector roughly a 20 percent decline in promotions in midcareer and a 46 percent 
decline in peak career compared to the early career phase). Nor does it obscure the female-
favoring trends in gender difference in promobility over the career. We see that while women 
are on average estimated to be about 15 percent less likely (exp-0.163) to be promoted than 
males in the early career phase, the gender gap is closed over the next two stages and females 
come to gain a slight edge; specifically, their promotion probability is about 7.5 percent 
higher in mid career (exp0.235-0.163-1=0.075) and about 1 percent greater in peak career 
(exp0.176-0.163-1=0.013). Each of these estimates is statistically significant.  
In the first model, we also see that promotion probability in early career is about 20 
percent higher (exp0.186) in the public sector on average compared to the private sector. We 
would next like to see if this is the case for both genders. Public sector jobs may be more 
structured in terms of career ladders and they are more highly unionized. Moreover, there 
may be gender differences in occupational choice in the public sector, which may in turn lead 
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to differences in career progression. Thus, in Model 2 we also allow public and private sector 
employees to have different averages by gender, all else equal. We see that once we allow 
public sector employment to contribute differently to the promotion probability of males and 
females, gender disparity is smaller in private sector (exp-0.126-1=-0.118) compared to that in 
the public sector (exp-0.126-0.203-1 = -0.280) in the early career. This gender disparity favoring 
females in promotion rates in the private sector persists in mid- and peak career (the 
coefficient estimates are 0.176 for mid-career and 0.179 for peak career, meaning that 
females are about 5 percent more likely to be promoted vis-à-vis males in each of these later 
career stages), even if in this model only the difference in mid career is statistically 
significant.16  
We next allow gender to affect promotion probability differently, not only by sector 
and career stage but also by educational attainment within these dimensions and work with a 
full set of interactions. Thus far, our estimates do not seem to be consistent with the glass 
ceilings that females are said to confront as they age because females are more likely on 
average to be promoted than males. However, glass ceilings may be more of a concern for 
highly educated groups than the less educated. Moreover, there is the possibility of glass 
doors initially preventing women acquiring jobs with lots of advancement opportunities 
(statistical discrimination) but permitting higher rates once these doors are negotiated (i.e. 
belief flipping following statistical discrimination). This phenomenon might also be expected 
to reflect educational status. Another possibility is the timing of fertility choice, as age at first 
birth is on average increasing in education level. In Model 3, where we allow differential 
                                                          
16Women in the public sector are less likely to be promoted than their private-sector 
counterparts in early career, but more likely in mid- and peak career. However, while 
economically material (exp-0.203-1=-0.184, that is 18% less in early career, and 
exp0.051+0.103+0.323-1 or 53% more in mid career and exp0.051+0.475-0.063-1 or 60% in peak career) 
neither difference is statistically significant. The decline in promotion rates over the career is 
less severe for males in the public sector (exp-0.623 versus exp-0.623+0.475+0.05). In fact, male 
public sector employees are about 70% likely to be promoted in peak career than are male 
private-sector employees.   
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affects by educational attainment (in addition to the sector of employment), we see that 
female gains in promotion probability relative to males seem to be for less educated women 
(in both sectors) moving from early career to mid and peak career. Gender disparities in 
promotion rates are much stronger for the least educated group than the average effect we 
have thus far estimated. For this educational group in early career, females in the private 
sector are about 33 percent less likely (e-0.396-1=0.33) to be promoted than their male 
counterparts. (They are also disadvantaged in public sector as well, although on this occasion 
while the female interaction coefficient (0.017) is positive, it is small in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant.) Females in the higher education groups are more likely to be 
promoted than their less educated female counterparts in early career. In particular, female 
college graduates in the private sector are about 83 percent more likely (exp0.607-1=0.83) to be 
promoted than the lowest educated group. These females also about 23 percent more likely 
(exp0.607-0.396-1=0.23) to be promoted than their male private-sector counterparts. This 
premium disappears by midcareer, when these female college graduates are not only less 
likely to be promoted than in the early career stage but also less likely compared to males of 
similar educational background and also females with less education. As can be seen, the 
gender disparity is especially large for this education group in the public sector compared to 
all other groups in later career stages.  
Finally, in Model 4 we exploit the panel nature of our data and allow for unobserved 
fixed factors that are potentially correlated with the observed determinants of promotion 
probability. Incorporating unobserved factors does not reduce the disparities, and in fact 
makes them larger and more significant in some cases (even though we lose about 463 
individuals/5000 observations due to lack of change in the promotion outcome over the 10 
years of data). In this model, too, we see that reversal of the male-female disparity in 
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promotion probability is for the lowest education group. In the highest education group, 
females lose ground to males and this is more significant in the public sector. 
In sum, the promotion results indicate that the reversal of gender disparity in 
promotion probability that we observe in the raw data is still on average what we find ceteris 
paribus. However, there are differences among females by education status and sector. 
Although females of the highest education group are more likely to be promoted than males 
in early career in private sector and just as likely to be promoted in public sector, they lose 
ground over the next two career stages in both sectors, but especially in public sector. What 
we observe as changes in gender promotion disparity favoring females are to be seen as a 
combination of much higher promotion rates for less educated females and much lower rates 
for males in general.  
We will next inquire into the returns to promotion and seek to explain the existence or 
lack of gender disparity in wage growth in light of our promotion regression findings, before 
turning finally to determine whether the disadvantage we estimate for educated females in 
late career stages is informed by the fertility timing differences of higher and lesser educated 
women.  
(b) Returns to promotion by gender: the role of education and sector through the career 
stages  
A critical component of any study of promotion is the analysis of its consequences. 
Accordingly, we next discuss our wage growth estimates, emphasizing the role of promotion 
along with education, gender, and sector by career stage.17 In Table 3 we report the estimates 
                                                          
17As mentioned earlier, the BLS changed data collection frequency after 1994, making the 
survey biennial. As a result, the returns to promotion in early career data are not directly 
comparable to the mid- and peak career values, and running a regression on the whole data 
without proper adjustments would imply biased estimates. We chose to perform separate 
regressions to avoid losing a year of observations (while biennializing promotion rates). 
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for equation (2) estimated separately for each career stage. We report the estimates in a 
similar format to Table 2; thus, for each career stage, the first column of results is for the 
main variable and the second bolded column contains the estimates for the variable interacted 
with the female dummy. The new dimension we are exploring here is wage growth due to 
promotion (although the first panel of the table contains results for wage growth in the 
absence of promotion). We assume that promotion contributes to wage growth differently by 
education and sector in addition to there being gender differences; thus, in the shaded second 
panel for each regression, we present the interactions with the promotion status dummy. 
Finally, in the bottom panel of the table, we report coefficient estimates for variables 
representing changes in a worker’s situation, such as divorce, a new birth, a move to a new 
employer, and a change in union status or sector of employment. 
 Table 4 is designed to make interpretation of the results contained in Table 3 easier by 
providing average marginal effects for the promotion indicator by sector, gender, education, 
and career stage. We will use the two tables simultaneously in our discussion of wage growth 
results. Finally, our discussion will also incorporate the calculations of wage growth resulting 
from promotion shown in Table 5 to provide insights into the relative importance of 
promotions to wage growth for each subsample.  
[Tables 3 and 4 near here] 
Looking at the early career estimates in Table 3 we see that, for males in the private 
sector with at most a high school education, promotion increases wage growth by about 4.6 
percentage points. For females with the same educational background in the private sector, 
the returns are 2.3 percentage points higher (although this gender difference is not 
significant). We also fail to observe any significant increase or decrease in returns by 
education level even though wage growth in the absence of promotion is higher in the private 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Pooling all career stages and running only one regression yielded very similar results. All 
estimates are available upon request.  
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sector with increased education (among males, it is 1.2 percentage points higher for those 
with some college and 1.8 percentage points higher for college graduates than for those 
individuals with just a high school education). Female college graduates realize higher 
returns to promotion in the private sector in early career as well as being more likely to be 
promoted (As noted later, this concatenation almost doubles the amount of promotion-driven 
wage growth for females compared to males.)  These results are, moreover, very similar to 
those reported by Cobb-Clark (2001; Table 4).18  
In the early career phase in the public sector, females with some college have higher 
returns to promotion, not only vis-à-vis other females but also compared to males. They have 
lower wage growth than their male counterparts if not promoted (about 4.3 percentage points 
lower [(-0.004-0.039)*100] but when promoted their wage growth is 7.1 percentage points 
higher [(0.023-0.047-0.037+0.132)*100]. On the other hand, female college graduates and 
females with at most a high school degree fare worse than their male counterparts. Even 
though wage growth is higher for non-promoted high school graduate females than for their 
male counterparts, males in this education group realize higher wage growth when promoted. 
Female college graduates, however, have lower wage growth than males irrespective of 
promotion, resulting in a 4.2 percentage point difference in returns to promotion [(0.023-
0.047+0.007-0.026)*100 from Table 3, or (0.107-0.065)*100 from Table 4].              
In the mid-career phase, we observe a dampening in the wage returns to promotion, 
recalling that we are now calculating wage growth over two years in the mid (and peak) 
                                                          
18One thing to keep in mind when looking at these results is the nature of the promotions in 
our data; they are in-house promotions and as such negatively correlated with having a new 
job (see Appendix Table 2). In this career stage, when external mobility is at its peak and 
may result in better job matches, it is not altogether surprising that highly educated 
individuals who are promoted do not always enjoy higher returns. 
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career portion(s) of our data, not the annual measure of the early period.19 Promoted high 
school graduate males realize 7.2 percentage points higher wage growth than their non-
promoted counterparts in the private sector. Female high school graduates have slightly lower 
returns to promotion (2.1 percentage points) but this gender difference is not statistically 
significant. Compared to the early career years, the gains from promotion for those with some 
college education increase for both genders in the private sector. In the public sector, 
however, females lose ground (their returns decline from 12.1 percentage points to 5 
percentage points) while males gain an additional 3 percentage points (from 4.9 to 8 
percentage points) in returns to promotion.  
The public sector records higher wage growth than the private sector for the lowest 
educated females in this career stage. (Their wage growth is 5.8 percentage points higher than 
in the private sector and 6 percentage points higher than that of males.)  However, when 
promoted they realize much lower wage growth returns in the public sector (about 3.1 
percentage points lower than males). And from Table 4, we see that this translates into only 
about 1 percentage point higher wage growth. Female college graduates in the public sector 
receive lower wage growth than the least educated females in this sector if not promoted, but 
not when they receive a promotion. Such females also receive modestly higher wage growth 
when promoted than their male counterparts (6.3 percentage points versus 5.8 percentage 
points). In the private sector by contrast, promoted females with a college degree obtain 
returns to promotion that are 2 percentage points lower than their male counterparts (i.e. the 
wage returns to promotion are 6.5 percentage points for males and 4.1 percentage points for 
females).     
[Table 5 near here] 
                                                          
19In fact, in estimates using “biennialized” data we obtain negative coefficients for the 
interaction terms of mid career and the promotion dummy as well as peak career and the 
promotion dummy.  
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The peak career results given in the final two columns of Table 3 taken in conjunction 
with the wage return calculations from Tables 4 and 5 reveal some interesting and significant 
wage growth differences by sector, gender, and education. Wage growth for females in the 
lowest educational category is lower in both sectors in the absence of promotion than for their 
male counterparts but higher when promoted; as a result, they have much higher returns to 
promotions.20 In the private sector, the average marginal effects reported for the promotion 
variable in Table 4 indicate that these less-educated females on average enjoy 7.5 percentage-
points higher wage growth when promoted as compared with a 6.2 percentage-point return 
for males. In the public sector the difference is even starker: females in the lowest educational 
category have almost double the return to promotion (4 percentage points versus 2.1 
percentage points for males). More educated females on the other hand are not so fortunate; 
not only are they less likely to be promoted, but they also gain less from a public sector 
promotion in peak career than their male counterparts; looking at the lower right corner of 
Table 4 we see that males enjoy much stronger returns to promotion than females, some 4 
percentage points more in the case of college graduates and 14.3 more for those with some 
college.  
In Table 5, using the counterfactual (non-promotion) wage growth generated for the 
promoted, we combine the estimates from observed promotion and wage growth rates to 
present a more direct measure of the importance of promotion to wage growth. Our 
calculations for the share of wage growth attributable to promotion closely resemble the 
figures obtained by Cobb-Clark (2001; Table 5) for early career, and thus provide a nice 
baseline. Female high school graduates have almost double the share of wage growth from 
promotions since, as discussed above, they not only have higher returns to promotion but also 
                                                          
20Although this result is not significant in the pooled model, if we estimate the model for 
workers in the private and public sectors separately we can confirm the significance of the 
differences. 
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are more likely to be promoted. In Table 4 we saw that female college graduates have much 
lower wage growth than males in mid career. When combined with their lower promotion 
probability in the private sector during this phase, the result is that promotion accounts for a 
much lower proportion of wage growth for this group (17.9% for males and just 12.05% for 
females). In the public sector, on the other hand, although their promotion probability is low, 
the returns to promotion for female college graduates are much higher – about 60 percent 
more – than those received by their male counterparts (14.4% versus 8.9%). Differential rates 
of promotion and wage growth in the public sector in the peak career years for the college 
educated translate into a huge gender gap in terms of the payoff to promotion; specifically, 
while male wage growth from promotions is 54.8 percent in this phase it is just 10.3 percent 
for females.  
Returning to Table 3 and looking at the balance of the coefficient estimates shown in 
the bottom panel of the table, we note that changing employers tends to harm wage growth – 
most notably in peak career. The lack of importance of inter-firm mobility to wage growth in 
early career may reflect the offsetting contributions of external and internal mobility, as 
individuals who are not changing employers are more likely to be promoted. However, 
moving to a larger firm pays off in all career stages. And even though it decreases wage 
growth in the early career years, an increase in unemployment seemingly has the opposite 
effect in peak career, which might conceivably reflect labor hoarding. For its part, gaining 
union coverage translates into a wage increase, although this is less important in peak career 
compared to earlier years, which career result may also be said to apply to changing sector of 
employment. 
 In sum, Tables 3 through 5 tell us that more highly educated women not only receive 
fewer promotions than males in mid- and peak career but also that in most cases these 
promotions are accompanied by much reduced wage growth as well. The result is that a much 
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smaller share of wage growth is attributable to promotion. This is the case for female college 
graduates in the private sector and for both college graduates and those with some college in 
the public sector. The disparity is most notable in the public sector where the contribution of 
promotion to wage growth in peak career for more highly educated women is one-fifth that of 
males among college graduates and a little over one twenty-fifth that of males among those 
with some college.  
  
(c) Why are educated women disadvantaged in promotion in later career? 
Our findings regarding promotions and the education level of women may in part reflect the 
timing of career breaks taken by women for childbirth. Female college graduates may be 
postponing childbirth until their mid-career years, while women with at most a high school 
education may be having children early on and delaying their career progression until mid 
career. Miller (2011) reports large returns to earnings from delayed fertility, especially for 
college-educated females. Appendix Table 4 shows that on average individuals in the highest 
educational group give birth to their first child six years later than the least educated. 
Moreover, having a child in any career stage is negatively correlated with promotion and 
wage growth for women, even though its contribution is positive for males. Addison, Ozturk, 
and Wang (2014) report that women without children are more likely to be promoted than 
men and also on average compared to women with children. However, they do not compare 
favorably to women whose children are no longer young by the end of early career phase. We 
want to know if these differences in the timing of fertility help explain some of the patterns 
uncovered earlier, and in particular whether they reduce the significance of gender disparities 
in promotions and the returns to promotion that we have  estimated.  
Clearly, a later start to fertility affects when educated women receive the shock to 
their career progressions. Education level may be capturing this difference in timing as the 
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two variables are highly correlated. In fact, if we were to re-estimate the model replacing the 
education dummies with a “late start” indicator for fertility (denoting first birth either at or 
after age 30 or at or after age 35), we observe similar estimates, with the late start variable 
now capturing the large penalty experienced by females in peak career.21 However, fertility 
timing is palpably not the whole story. We see this in the following robustness checks in 
which we first re-estimate Model 3 from our promotion regression (see Table 2) by allowing 
fertility-related changes to affect men and woman differently, and then restricting our sample 
to workers who either (i) did not have any children after age 25 or (ii) are without children.  
[Table 6 near here] 
 Results are given in Table 6. The first column of the table follows the original format 
of Model 3, in which number of children is not interacted with the female dummy variable. 
The second column introduces this interaction term to the regression. The coefficient estimate 
for the number of children variable in the original model is positive and insignificant. 
However, allowing for differences between genders in response to the number of children, we 
see that the argument is associated with a decreased promotion probability for females even if 
the main effect remains positive. In the third column of Table 6, where we restrict our sample 
to individuals with no late fertility – that is no new births after age 25 – our estimates for late-
career promotion prospects for female college graduates are unaffected. The sample contains 
relatively few individuals who never had children,22 but even for female college graduates in 
this group the estimates reported in the fourth column of the table indicate significantly lower 
promotion probability, especially for those in the public sector. Nor for that matter does 
controlling for time invariant individual unobserved factors for the no late fertility group 
moderate our estimates (see the last set of result in Table 6).  
                                                          
21These estimates are available upon request. 
 
22As a matter of fact, there are no childless women with some college education in the public 
sector in peak career, and so no coefficient estimate to report for this interaction term.  
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 Results for wage growth are remitted to Appendix Table 5. The wage growth 
regressions are estimated with a new birth argument that is interacted with the female dummy 
as well as for the restricted sample of individuals with no late fertility. In these estimates, 
there is a significant negative effect in the first period for females from new births, though the 
effect is positive for males. The gender difference in the sign of the coefficient estimates 
persists through the career years; while statistically insignificant, the economic effect is 
material and comparable to earlier years. In sum, although fertility timing and birth event are 
significant factors in both promotion probability and wage growth, they do not erase the 
gender differences we estimate.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
 
In the present treatment, we have sought to provide ‘career-updated’ estimates of the role of 
gender in promotions and of the consequences of such promotions. We build on past studies 
from the NLSY that, while offering an improvement on an earlier literature in terms of their 
representativeness and panel nature, only consider individuals at the early stages of their 
careers. Apart from being able to exploit data on promotion and earnings for individuals now 
also at later stages of their careers, we were also motivated to examine the role of education 
and broad sector (private vs. public) since there were intriguing hints in NLSY studies and 
the wider literature that promotional opportunities as well as the returns to promotions might 
be strongly influenced by educational background and sector. 
Although our investigation of the role of gender, education, and sector has produced 
some often interesting diversions on the promotion-earnings theme, as reflected in the 
detailed pattern of interaction coefficients, the main findings of the present exercise can be 
summarized as follows. First, we found that private sector females with at most a high school 
education – our lowest educational category – are significantly less likely to be promoted in 
early career compared to males. Further, they receive fewer promotions than their more 
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educated female counterparts (i.e. those having some college and college graduates). Second, 
however, these females are much more likely to be promoted in mid- and peak career, not 
only compared to their own early career experience but also compared to their 
contemporaries (i.e. males and females with more schooling). Third, these promotion patterns 
are repeated in mid- and peak career - at least for public sector females with at most a high 
school education. Fourth, although more educated females lose their edge to the least skilled 
females, males enjoy significant returns to their schooling in terms of promotions. Finally, 
these discrepancies in the promotion returns to schooling are also manifested in our wage 
growth analysis. Women with either some college or with college or more not only lag 
behind in promotions in mid- and peak career but do not receive the higher wage growth 
associated with promotions of their male counterparts.  
These findings regarding promotions and the education level of women reflect in part 
the timing of career breaks taken by women for childbirth. College educated females are 
delaying child birth until their mid-30s, representing the start of their mid-career years, while 
women with at most a high school education are having children early and delaying their 
career progression until mid career. However, fertility timing does not erase the gender 
differences promotion probability and returns to promotion among the highly educated, 
suggesting that the lack of returns in later career years for more highly educated women may 
also be a consequence of glass ceilings or shorter career ladders. Alternatively, such women 
may be using their leverage with employers not for promotions and, instead of “leaning in,” 
seek more flexibility on their jobs in order to achieve a work family life balance and in that 
sense choosing not to “have it all.” 
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Figure 1: Promotion Rates by Gender over a Career
Male Promotion Rate
Female Promotion Rate
Note: Dashed lines connect 95% confidence interval upper and lower points around the mean promotion rate at any given year
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Early Career Mid Career Peak Career
Promotion rate 0.286 0.183 0.100
Real pay 19.37 25.72 28.85
Real pay growth 0.086 0.100 0.054
Non-promoted 0.070 0.084 0.045
Promoted 0.126 0.170 0.134
Promotion rate 0.247 0.195 0.115
Real pay 15.73 20.67 22.92
Real pay growth 0.075 0.096 0.058
Non-promoted 0.058 0.083 0.051
Promoted 0.127 0.149 0.112
Are gender differences significant?
Promotion rate 3.05 1.15 1.89
Real pay 16.2 14.3 12.8
Real pay growth 1.64 0.75 0.77
Non-promoted 1.60 0.26 1.06
Promoted 0.07 1.43 0.98
Note: Early career wage growth and promotion rates are calculated 
over a single year since the previous interview. Wage growth rates in 
the later career stages, however, are calculated over (approximately) 
two years as the survey became biennial in 1994. 
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Table 1: Promotion Probability and Wage Growth by Promotion 
Status, by Gender and Career Stage
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Main 
Female 
Interaction Main 
Female 
Interaction Main 
Female 
Interaction Main 
Female 
Interaction 
(Less than college in private sector) -0.163* -0.126+ -0.396** -
[0.070] [0.075] [0.123]
Public sector 0.186* - 0.051 -0.203 0.290 0.017 0.906* -1.073+
[0.073] [0.142] [0.201] [0.227] [0.399] [0.407] [0.638]
Some college 0.142** - 0.140** - 0.137 0.191 - -
[0.052] [0.052] [0.108] [0.177]
College or more -0.014 - -0.011 - -0.296** 0.607** - -
[0.057] [0.057] [0.107] [0.173]
Some college•Public sector - - - - -0.456 -0.212 -0.517 0.064
[0.352] [0.581] [0.594] [0.896]
College or more•Public sector - - - - -0.212 -0.404 -0.953+ 0.785
[0.306] [0.495] [0.510] [0.773]
Mid career -0.230** 0.235* -0.240** 0.176+ -0.396** 0.562** -0.028 0.659**
[0.084] [0.093] [0.087] [0.100] [0.114] [0.166] [0.153] [0.179]
Mid career•Public sector - - 0.103 0.323 -0.288 0.624 -0.705+ 1.267*
[0.180] [0.265] [0.334] [0.533] [0.407] [0.605]
Mid career•Some college - - - - 0.036 -0.402 0.062 -0.447+
[0.157] [0.251] [0.170] [0.270]
Mid career•College or more - - - - 0.446** -0.754** 0.637** -0.886**
[0.141] [0.240] [0.153] [0.257]
- - - - 1.004* -0.404 1.525** -1.113
[0.481] [0.749] [0.575] [0.865]
- - - - 0.162 -0.225 0.468 -0.918
[0.435] [0.663] [0.507] [0.745]
Peak career -0.548** 0.176+ -0.623** 0.179 -0.728** 0.321 -0.096 0.370+
[0.123] [0.106] [0.127] [0.116] [0.154] [0.199] [0.226] [0.213]
Peak career•Public sector - - 0.475* -0.063 0.236 0.207 -0.103 1.022
[0.190] [0.285] [0.339] [0.553] [0.418] [0.632]
Peak career•Some college - - - - -0.050 0.070 -0.078 0.098
[0.187] [0.293] [0.204] [0.317]
Peak career•College or more - - - - 0.372* -0.469+ 0.564** -0.563+
[0.163] [0.280] [0.177] [0.298]
- - - - 0.321 -0.254 0.772 -1.086
[0.513] [0.799] [0.614] [0.935]
- - - - 0.297 -0.391 0.700 -1.372+
[0.443] [0.697] [0.522] [0.790]
Number of observations
Number of individuals
Table 2: Promotion Probability and Gender 
(LOGIT)
Coefficient Estimates for Main Variables and their Interaction with the Female Indicator
(XTLOGIT, FE)
MODEL 4
Panel Data ModelCross Sectional Models 
Mid career•Some college•Public 
sector
Peak career•Some college•Public 
sector
MODEL 1
Note: All models include controls for race, ethnicity, the unexplained portion of the ASVAB score, marital status, number of 
children, firm size, unionism, unemployment, quadratic tenure with the current employer, quadratic labor market experience prior 
to the current employer, and industry and occupation on the current job. Standard errors are reported in brackets. **,*, and + 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Peak career•College or 
more•Public sector
1456
13815186581865818658
Mid career•College or more•Public 
sector
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Female Female Female
No Promotion Interaction Interaction Interaction
-0.004 0.002 -0.006
[0.012] [0.009] [0.009]
Public sector 0.003 0.020 -0.004 0.060** 0.036** -0.008
[0.023] [0.039] [0.016] [0.028] [0.015] [0.024]
Some college 0.012 0.001 0.013 0.005 0.007 0.017
[0.012] [0.019] [0.009] [0.015] [0.009] [0.014]
College or more 0.018 -0.010 0.034** -0.004 0.029** 0.002
[0.011] [0.019] [0.009] [0.015] [0.008] [0.014]
Some college•Public sector -0.003 -0.039 0.008 -0.061 -0.041+ 0.034
[0.036] [0.057] [0.026] [0.041] [0.023] [0.035]
College or more•Public sector -0.006 -0.022 0.015 -0.092** -0.070** 0.052
[0.032] [0.050] [0.022] [0.035] [0.021] [0.032]
Gains from Promotion 
0.046** 0.023 0.072** -0.021 0.062** 0.013
[0.013] [0.025] [0.014] [0.023] [0.018] [0.030]
Promoted•Public sector 0.045 -0.047 -0.01 -0.031 -0.041 0.006
[0.044] [0.082] [0.046] [0.067] [0.048] [0.072]
Promoted•Some college -0.009 -0.037 -0.011 0.022 -0.002 -0.031
[0.022] [0.037] [0.023] [0.036] [0.030] [0.046]
Promoted•College or more -0.007 0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.015 -0.006
[0.020] [0.035] [0.020] [0.033] [0.025] [0.043]
-0.032 0.132 0.028 0.001 0.137+ -0.131
[0.074] [0.121] [0.062] [0.090] [0.073] [0.107]
0.023 -0.026 0.003 0.061 0.108+ -0.053
[0.061] [0.102] [0.059] [0.086] [0.061] [0.096]
Other changes
New birth 0.011 - 0.005 - 0.024 -
[0.010] [0.009] [0.022]
Getting married or divorced 0.005 - -0.004 - 0.002 -
[0.010] [0.009] [0.011]
Moving to or from public sector 0.045** - 0.024 - -0.027 -
[0.018] [0.015] [0.022]
Gaining or losing union coverage 0.016+ - 0.024** - 0.015 -
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010]
Moving to or from a bigger firm 0.009+ - 0.010** - 0.010** -
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005]
Change in unemployment rate -0.002 - -0.001 - 0.002+ -
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
New employer 0.006 - -0.019** - -0.026** -
[0.011] [0.009] [0.010]
Number of observations
R-squared
Main Main Main 
Note:All regressions also control for change in industry and occupation, and quadratics in tenure and experience. Change variables are 
created as Xt-Xt-1.  New birth and New employer  are 0-1 dummy indicators and Change in unemployment  is continuous. Changes in 
marital status, sector, firm size and unionism can take the values -1, 0 and 1; for example, the Getting married or divorced  variable is +1 if 
the individual gets married, -1 if divorced (or widowed) and 0 if there is no change (the individual is still single or married). Standard errors 
are reported in brackets. **,*, and + indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 3: Wage Growth and Gender by Promotion Status over Career Stages
Coefficient Estimates for Main Variables and their Interaction with the Female 
and Promotion Status Indicators
Early Career Mid Career Peak Career
Promoted (Less than college in private 
sector)
5,514
0.031
5,867
0.0470.044
4,303
Promoted•College or more•Public sector
Promoted•Some college•Public sector
(Less than college in private sector )
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Males Females Males Females Males Females
0.046 0.069 0.072 0.051 0.062 0.075
[0.013]** [0.021]** [0.014]** [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.025]**
0.037 0.023 0.062 0.063 0.060 0.042
[0.017]* [0.021] [0.018]** [0.020]** [0.025]* [0.024]+
0.039 0.070 0.065 0.041 0.047 0.054
[0.015]* [0.020]** [0.014]** [0.019]* [0.018]** [0.024]*
0.091 0.067 0.062 0.010 0.021 0.040
[0.042]* [0.066] [0.044] [0.045] [0.044] [0.049]
0.049 0.121 0.080 0.050 0.157 0.014
[0.056] [0.064]* [0.037]* [0.038] [0.050]* [0.049]
0.107 0.065 0.058 0.063 0.114 0.074
[0.039]** [0.038]+ [0.034]+ [0.034]+ [0.034]** [0.044]+
P
u
b
l
i
c
Less than college 
Some college
College or more
Note:  Marginal effects are generated using the margins command in Stata after running wage growth regressions. The 
margins  command generated wage growth estimates if all individuals were promoted and if none were promoted.  We test 
the equality of these two estimates using the lincom command, and  report the standard deviation of the difference in 
brackets.  **,*, and + indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
Less than college 
Some college
College or more
Table 4: Marginal Effect of Promotion on Wage Growth, by Sector,  Education and Gender 
across Career Stages
Early Career Mid Career Peak Career 
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Males Females Males Females Males Females
Less than college 22.349 31.955 17.494 17.591 19.822 33.075
Some college 23.919 11.699 16.534 15.496 20.364 10.969
At least college 16.565 32.997 17.896 12.045 15.751 11.424
Less than college 34.702 22.266 14.590 3.391 5.097 16.186
Some college 28.172 40.221 25.703 16.173 50.472 2.147
At least college 38.136 31.009 8.854 14.388 54.751 10.271P
u
b
l
i
c
Note:  Each cell contains Percent promoted •(wage growth of the promoted - wage 
growth of the promoted in the absence of promotion)/wage growth. All rates except the 
counterfactual for wage growth of the promoted sans promotion are observed values. 
Table 5: Wage Growth from Promotion
Early Career Mid Career Peak Career 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
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Main
Female 
Interaction Main
Female 
Interaction Main
Female 
Interaction Main
Female 
Interaction Main
Female 
Interaction
-0.396** -0.321* -0.404+ -0.168 -
[0.123] [0.130] [0.214] [0.287] -
Some college 0.137 0.017 0.143 0.173 0.113 0.258 0.333 -0.02 - -
[0.108] [0.399] [0.108] [0.177] [0.208] [0.297] [0.241] [0.385] - -
College or more -0.296** 0.191 -0.283** 0.559** -0.519* 0.597+ -0.25 0.314 - -
[0.107] [0.177] [0.107] [0.175] [0.221] [0.314] [0.249] [0.378] - -
Number of children 0.005
-
0.026 -0.066+ -0.03 -0.008
- - - -
[0.018]
-
[0.022] [0.037] [0.065] [0.086]
- - - -
Public sector 0.29 0.607** 0.291 0.016 0.377 -0.356 1.946** -2.089+ 1.564 -2.225
[0.227] [0.173] [0.227] [0.399] [0.506] [0.767] [0.740] [1.097] [1.211] [1.430]
-0.456 -0.212 -0.459 -0.206 -0.719 0.101 -1.581 0.331 0.62 -1.453
[0.352] [0.581] [0.352] [0.581] [0.791] [1.130] [1.026] [1.682] [1.669] [2.009]
-0.212 -0.404 -0.21 -0.389 0.72 -0.885 -0.952 0.494 -1.229 1.474
[0.306] [0.495] [0.306] [0.495] [0.665] [0.971] [0.863] [1.276] [1.450] [1.728]
Mid career -0.396** 0.562** -0.399** 0.596** -0.525* 0.673* -0.440+ 0.753+ -0.086 0.780**
[0.114] [0.166] [0.114] [0.168] [0.207] [0.273] [0.267] [0.388] [0.274] [0.294]
Mid career•Public sector -0.288 0.624 -0.288 0.634 -1.19 2.281* -1.784 2.504+ -2.547+ 3.944*
[0.334] [0.533] [0.334] [0.533] [0.898] [1.138] [1.090] [1.514] [1.437] [1.633]
Mid career•Some college 0.036 -0.402 0.037 -0.395 -0.016 -0.912* -0.077 -1.025+ -0.088 -0.688
[0.157] [0.251] [0.157] [0.251] [0.298] [0.430] [0.348] [0.562] [0.329] [0.467]
0.446** -0.754** 0.440** -0.736** 0.685* -0.721+ 0.575+ -0.870+ 0.808** -0.820+
[0.141] [0.240] [0.141] [0.240] [0.288] [0.420] [0.329] [0.516] [0.313] [0.452]
1.004* -0.404 1.005* -0.426 2.493* -1.999 1.772 -0.984 3.170+ -3.101
[0.481] [0.749] [0.481] [0.749] [1.165] [1.518] [1.413] [2.166] [1.698] [2.045]
0.162 -0.225 0.161 -0.245 -0.046 -1.01 0.619 -0.759 1.663 -3.016
[0.435] [0.663] [0.435] [0.663] [1.073] [1.384] [1.241] [1.731] [1.585] [1.856]
Peak career -0.728** 0.321 -0.723** 0.364+ -0.879** 0.546+ -0.587+ 0.776+ -0.191 0.740*
[0.154] [0.199] [0.154] [0.200] [0.267] [0.308] [0.336] [0.412] [0.404] [0.339]
Peak career•Public sector 0.236 0.207 0.233 0.218 -1.244 2.238+ -2.209+ 3.073+ -2.695+ 4.107*
[0.339] [0.553] [0.339] [0.553] [1.149] [1.357] [1.294] [1.681] [1.602] [1.792]
Peak career•Some college -0.05 0.07 -0.05 0.073 -0.177 -0.25 -0.643 -0.224 -0.264 0.162
[0.187] [0.293] [0.187] [0.293] [0.343] [0.483] [0.408] [0.610] [0.384] [0.533]
0.372* -0.469+ 0.361* -0.448 0.15 -0.172 -0.284 -0.394 0.43 -0.374
[0.163] [0.280] [0.163] [0.280] [0.335] [0.480] [0.382] [0.574] [0.364] [0.518]
0.321 -0.254 0.327 -0.272 2.436+ -2.252 2.511 - 3.306+ -3.586
[0.513] [0.799] [0.513] [0.799] [1.394] [1.716] [1.596] - [1.920] [2.268]
0.297 -0.391 0.301 -0.409 0.819 -1.945 2.017 -2.838 2.603 -3.925+
[0.443] [0.697] [0.443] [0.697] [1.305] [1.609] [1.439] [1.942] [1.751] [2.035]
Number of observations
Number of individuals
Mid career•College or more
Peak career•College or more
Note:  aThe No late fertility  group consists of those individuals who did not have any additional children after age 25.  Standard errors are reported in 
brackets. **,*, and + indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Peak career•College or more•Public 
sector
Peak career•Some college•Public 
sector
Mid career•College or more•Public 
sector
Mid career•Some college•Public sector
Table 6: Promotion Probability and Fertility
Childless
MODEL 3
4277
460
4033602518658 18658
MODEL 4
Female•Number of 
Children No Late Fertilitya           No Late Fertility           Original Model
Some college•Public sector
College or more•Public sector
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Variable Description Mean St.D Mean St.D Mean St.D Mean St.D Mean St.D
Age Age of the individual at the interview date 28.34 2.27 28.34 2.33 28.40 2.33 38.58 3.11 46.23 3.14
AFQTb AFQT score 0.56 0.29 0.53 0.29 0.54 0.28 0.54 0.28 0.54 0.28
Education Maximum years of education reported over the data period 13.97 2.65 13.90 2.59 14.02 2.52 14.06 2.54 14.06 2.53
(High school or less)c Less than 13 years of schooling 0.39 0.49 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49
Some college 13 to 15 years of schooling 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44
College or more More than 15 years of schooling 0.34 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47
Female Gender dummy =1 if female, 0 otherwise 0.53 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49
Black Race dummy=1 if Black, 0 otherwise 0.08 0.28 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32
Hispanic Enthnicity dummy=1 if Hispanic, 0 otherwise 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.24
Married Marital status dummy =1 if married, 0 otherwise 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.47 0.67 0.47
Number of children Number of children individual has at time t 0.65 0.97 0.84 1.06 0.88 1.06 1.57 1.25 1.73 1.29
Tenure with current firm Number of years worked at the current job (total weeks/52) 3.22 3.00 3.72 3.14 4.00 3.20 8.01 6.07 11.34 8.24
Prior labor market experience Number of years worked prior to current job  (total weeks/52) 5.12 2.98 4.94 2.90 4.85 2.90 10.10 5.89 14.08 7.88
(Small firm)c Firm with less than 100 employees 0.62 0.49 0.57 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50
Medium firm Firm with 100-499 employees 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44
Large firm Firm with more than 500 employees 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.41
State unemployment rate Level of unemployment at state level 5.83 2.23 6.14 2.39 6.20 2.44 5.48 2.57 5.61 1.75
Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting & mining 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.11
Construction 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26
(Manufacturing)c 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40
Wholesale trade & retail trade 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32
Transportation and warehousing & information & 
utilities
0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.31
Finance and insurance & real estate and rental and 
leasing
0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25
Professional, scientific, and technical services & 
management, administrative and support, and waste 
0.13 0.33 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26
Educational services & health care and social 
assistance
0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.14 0.35 0.17 0.37
Arts, entertainment, and recreation & accomodations 
and food services
0.10 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17
Other services 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.30
N=1128 N=9580 N=5284 N=6895 N=6652
Appendix Table 1. Definition of the Variables and Descriptive Statistics (1988-1990 and 1996-2010 rounds of the NLSY79)
Balanced Panel a
Early Early (All) Early Mid Peak
Industry dummies.  Different industry headings are 
combined after Pergamut and Veum (1996).
continues on the next page
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Variable Description Mean St.D Mean St.D Mean St.D Mean St.D Mean St.D
Management, professional, technical, financial, sales 
and public security 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.50
Administrative support and retail sales 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40
(Low-skill Service)c 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20
Precision production and craft 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20
Machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24
Transportation, construction, mechanics, mining, 
agricultural
0.15 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39
Public sector Individual is a public sector employee 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.34 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40
Union member and/or coveredd
Individual is a union member and/or covered under a collective 
bargaining agreement 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Real wagee Real wage at the current job 18.19 8.48 17.55 7.97 17.87 7.99 23.73 13.93 26.65 18.18
Real wage growthe Change in the real wage since the date of last interview 0.09 0.34 0.08 0.31 0.08 0.30 0.09 0.30 0.05 0.29
Log real wagee log of the real wage at the current job 2.79 0.48 2.77 0.44 2.79 0.43 3.04 0.49 3.10 0.67
Promoted Promotion dummy=1 if promoted at the job with the current 
employer since the date of last interview, 0 otherwise
0.22 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.19 0.39 0.11 0.31
continued from previous page
N=1128 N=9580 N=5284 N=6895 N=6652
Leavers Early (All) Early Mid Peak
Occupation dummies.  Different occupation groups are 
combined after Dorn (2009).
eFor these statistics we only use the data if the observation is in the sample for the wage regressions; this leads to a loss of some 10% of observations in each group.
Notes:  
aIndividuals are observed in 2 out of 3 years in the early career stage and not absent in more than two rounds in later stages. 
bIn the regressions we used standardized residuals from a regression of ASVAB scores on education and age of the respondent  (as of 1980) instead of the AFQT scores as measures of 
unobserved ability after  Blackburn (2004)  and Hansen et al (2004).
cOmitted categories given in parentheses.
dUnion membership or coverage data is collected in different ways across different waves of the NLSY79, which will require us to devise a common definition of unionism in our analysis. 
Over the early survey years – 1988, 1989, and 1990 – individuals were asked only if they were covered by a collective bargaining agreement. If they answered in the affirmative, 
respondents were then asked if they were a union member. After 1994, the union affiliation question was asked first and then the coverage question asked only of those responding in the 
negative (i.e. of the non-union members). Here we will use a ‘unified’ or ‘composite’ measure of unionism by including those who are either union members or covered by a union 
agreement as a definition, and assume that all union members are covered. Furthermore, due to an error in the NLSY questionnaire, information on union affiliation and collective bargaining 
was not collected for a number of employees in 1994. Specifically, 1130 of the employed individuals in our final sample were not asked the unionism question (i.e. whether they were union 
members and, if not, whether they were nonetheless covered on the job by a collective bargaining agreement). We imputed unionism values to these individuals by selectively utilizing 
other arguments  using a methodology similar to that of Booth, Budd, and Munday (2010).            
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MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4
Unobserved abilitya 0.087** 0.090** 0.084**
[0.025] [0.025] [0.026]
Black 0.050 0.050 0.029
[0.073] [0.073] [0.074]
Hispanic -0.006 -0.009 -0.041
[0.084] [0.084] [0.085]
Married 0.038 0.035 0.033 0.051
[0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.066]
Number of children 0.004 0.005 0.005 -0.082+
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.044]
Tenure with current firm -0.073** -0.074** -0.077** -0.136**
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.018]
Tenure with current firm squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Prior labor market experience -0.02 -0.02 -0.025+ -0.102**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.021]
Prior labor market experience squared -0.001 -0.001 0 0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
New employer -0.455** -0.455** -0.464** -0.550**
[0.070] [0.070] [0.070] [0.076]
Medium firm 0.193** 0.192** 0.194** 0.290**
[0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.068]
Large firm 0.358** 0.359** 0.353** 0.314**
[0.052] [0.052] [0.052] [0.082]
State unemployment rate -0.008 -0.008 -0.01 -0.029*
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.012]
Constant -0.570** -0.565** -0.419**
[0.141] [0.141] [0.152]
Number of observations 18,658 18,658 18,658 13,815
Number of individuals 1,456
Appendix Table 2: Promotion Probability and Gender, Results for Other Coefficient 
Estimates of Interest
Note: aStandardized residuals from a regression of ASVAB scores on education and age of the respondent(as of 1980). 
All models also include industry and occupation dummies. 
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Males Females Males Females Males Females
Wage growth rate 0.050 0.043 0.060 0.061 0.024 0.024
for promoted 0.083 0.097 0.124 0.108 0.081 0.102
for non-promoted 0.039 0.029 0.049 0.050 0.020 0.016
for promoted in absence of promotiona 0.036 0.032 0.053 0.057 0.015 0.018
Promotion rate 0.253 0.203 0.140 0.184 0.078 0.092
Wage growth rate 0.062 0.057 0.076 0.082 0.028 0.045
for promoted 0.092 0.074 0.131 0.137 0.091 0.080
for non-promoted 0.047 0.050 0.064 0.069 0.023 0.040
for promoted in absence of promotion 0.054 0.045 0.067 0.076 0.030 0.035
Promotion rate 0.326 0.275 0.187 0.186 0.085 0.123
Wage growth rate 0.073 0.068 0.099 0.086 0.054 0.048
for promoted 0.097 0.112 0.149 0.120 0.109 0.083
for non-promoted 0.061 0.046 0.081 0.075 0.046 0.043
for promoted in absence of promotion 0.060 0.046 0.082 0.080 0.047 0.041
Promotion rate 0.329 0.336 0.261 0.232 0.137 0.139
Wage growth rate 0.061 0.060 0.047 0.093 0.048 0.045
for promoted 0.120 0.104 0.102 0.103 0.072 0.095
for non-promoted 0.040 0.046 0.040 0.090 0.045 0.038
for promoted in absence of promotion 0.043 0.046 0.039 0.099 0.050 0.037
Promotion rate 0.263 0.232 0.112 0.230 0.093 0.130
Wage growth rate 0.070 0.051 0.080 0.084 0.030 0.059
for promoted 0.128 0.144 0.138 0.125 0.159 0.070
for non-promoted 0.051 0.031 0.059 0.070 0.015 0.057
for promoted in absence of promotion 0.072 0.028 0.064 0.074 0.013 0.056
Promotion rate 0.257 0.182 0.261 0.250 0.107 0.099
Wage growth rate 0.090 0.045 0.098 0.063 0.030 0.051
for promoted 0.179 0.102 0.140 0.127 0.118 0.104
for non-promoted 0.056 0.031 0.089 0.054 0.014 0.046
for promoted in absence of promotion 0.071 0.047 0.085 0.064 0.004 0.047
Promotion rate 0.278 0.194 0.170 0.122 0.159 0.090
Co
lle
ge
 
o
r 
m
o
re
Pu
bl
ic
Note: aThis is the predicted wage growth rate generated with the margins command for promoted 
individuals by sector, gender, education, and career stage in the absence of promotion.
Early Career
Appendix Table 3: Wage Growth and Promotion Rates, by Sector, Education Status, Gender, 
and Career Stage
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Less than 
college
Some 
college
College 
or more
Less than 
college
Some 
college
College 
or more
Less than 
college
Some 
college
College 
or more
Proportion married 0.598 0.583 0.554 0.672 0.639 0.782 0.669 0.659 0.800
New birth rate 0.112 0.125 0.117 0.067 0.085 0.136 0.015 0.016 0.023
Average age at first birtha 25.43 27.63 30.28 25.34 27.49 30.25 25.25 27.80 30.28
Promotion rate 0.253 0.326 0.329 0.140 0.187 0.261 0.078 0.085 0.137
Proportion married 0.553 0.517 0.470 0.584 0.589 0.630 0.593 0.571 0.608
New birth rate 0.089 0.063 0.078 0.043 0.048 0.075 0.002 0.009 0.008
Average age at first birth 23.70 24.54 29.49 23.42 24.27 29.40 23.36 24.41 29.15
Promotion rate 0.203 0.275 0.336 0.184 0.186 0.232 0.092 0.123 0.139
Proportion married 0.649 0.649 0.500 0.777 0.828 0.790 0.679 0.860 0.780
New birth rate 0.114 0.095 0.079 0.061 0.067 0.174 0.010 0.007 0.014
Average age at first birth 24.84 27.67 30.03 25.25 27.03 30.21 25.35 26.81 30.82
Promotion rate 0.263 0.257 0.278 0.112 0.261 0.170 0.093 0.107 0.159
Proportion married 0.643 0.561 0.561 0.630 0.583 0.723 0.610 0.617 0.676
New birth rate 0.125 0.091 0.111 0.010 0.030 0.086 0.008 0.007 0.000
Average age at first birth 23.68 27.19 28.07 22.72 26.50 28.45 23.55 25.89 28.23
Promotion rate 0.232 0.182 0.194 0.230 0.250 0.122 0.130 0.099 0.090
Appendix Table 4: Timing and Incidence of Life Events and Promotion Rates, by Gender, Education 
and Sector over the Career 
Early Career Mid Career Peak Career
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Note: aThis is the age at the first-ever birth and does not vary for an individual by career stage.  More or less constant averages indicate 
that the exits from the sample are not disproportionately for fertility-related reasons. 
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Main
Female 
Interaction Main
Female 
Interaction Main
Female 
Interaction Main
Female 
Interaction Main
Female 
Interaction Main
Female 
Interaction
0.000 0.002 0.002 0.006 -0.006 0.006
[0.011] [0.018] [0.009] [0.015] [0.009] [0.014]
Public sector 0.002 0.024 0.001 0.034 -0.002 0.059** -0.009 0.127*** 0.036** -0.007 0.040 -0.046
[0.022] [0.039] [0.047] [0.066] [0.015] [0.028] [0.031] [0.049] [0.014] [0.024] [0.029] [0.043]
Some college 0.008 0.003 0.014 -0.001 0.014 0.007 0.015 -0.011 0.007 0.015 0.041** -0.025
[0.012] [0.018] [0.022] [0.031] [0.009] [0.015] [0.018] [0.025] [0.009] [0.014] [0.016] [0.023]
College or more 0.019* -0.011 0.014 0.003 0.033*** 0.000 0.039** -0.02 0.029*** 0.001 0.029* 0.014
[0.011] [0.018] [0.022] [0.032] [0.009] [0.015] [0.019] [0.027] [0.008] [0.014] [0.016] [0.024]
Some college•Public sector -0.002 -0.042 0.006 -0.061 0.009 -0.064 0.067 -0.178** -0.043* 0.037 -0.090** 0.130**
[0.035] [0.055] [0.077] [0.101] [0.025] [0.040] [0.053] [0.073] [0.022] [0.034] [0.043] [0.060]
College or more•Public sector -0.005 -0.025 0.004 -0.008 0.012 -0.091*** 0.006 -0.122* -0.070*** 0.052 -0.057 0.106*
[0.031] [0.049] [0.071] [0.092] [0.022] [0.035] [0.045] [0.065] [0.020] [0.032] [0.040] [0.057]
Promoted 0.047*** 0.026 0.027 0.065 0.067*** -0.011 0.104*** -0.071* 0.057*** 0.012 0.127*** -0.041
[0.013] [0.024] [0.024] [0.041] [0.014] [0.022] [0.027] [0.038] [0.017] [0.029] [0.029] [0.044]
Promoted•Public sector 0.045 -0.056 0.014 0.012 -0.007 -0.037 -0.098 0.029 -0.041 0.014 -0.135 0.215
[0.044] [0.081] [0.100] [0.151] [0.046] [0.067] [0.142] [0.162] [0.046] [0.071] [0.131] [0.153]
Promoted•Some college -0.007 -0.039 0.006 -0.100* -0.003 0.006 -0.042 0.043 0.016 -0.04 -0.034 0.000
[0.021] [0.036] [0.041] [0.060] [0.022] [0.035] [0.043] [0.063] [0.030] [0.045] [0.053] [0.073]
Promoted•College or more -0.008 0.003 0.01 -0.085 -0.003 -0.013 -0.108*** 0.094 -0.011 -0.004 -0.046 -0.007
[0.020] [0.035] [0.042] [0.063] [0.019] [0.033] [0.041] [0.058] [0.025] [0.042] [0.054] [0.073]
-0.038 0.149 0.073 0.078 0.01 0.029 -0.016 0.093 0.113 -0.083 0.017 -0.132
[0.071] [0.118] [0.164] [0.228] [0.061] [0.089] [0.166] [0.199] [0.070] [0.101] [0.174] [0.207]
0.024 -0.017 0.02 -0.091 0.002 0.069 0.18 0.029 0.102* -0.057 0.114 -0.348
[0.061] [0.101] [0.133] [0.195] [0.059] [0.086] [0.163] [0.195] [0.059] [0.095] [0.153] [0.217]
New birth 0.026** -0.041** 0.229 0.000 0.012 -0.033* 0.033 -0.051
[0.011] [0.020] [0.195] [0.238] [0.010] [0.020] [0.023] [0.058]
Observations
R-squared
Mid Career Peak Career
Appendix Table 5:  Wage Growth and Fertility by Career Stage
6,094
0.0470.051
1,3974,470
0.045
1,813
0.06
5,729
0.031
1,941
0.065
Early Career
Note:  aNo late fertility group consists of those individuals who did not have any additional children after age 25.  Standard errors are reported in brackets. **,*, and + indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. All models use the same set of covariates as the original regressions; full estimates are available upon 
request.   
Female•New Birth Female•New Birth Female•New Birth
Promoted•College or more•Public 
sector
Promoted•Some college•Public 
sector
No Late Fertility No Late FertilityNo Late Fertilitya
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